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ABSTRACT. In this paper, I offer a reconstruction of Ghazālī’s encounter 
with skepticism in the Deliverance from Error. For Ghazālī, I argue, radical 
skepticism about the possibility of knowledge ensues from intellectualist 
assumptions about the nature of justification. On the reading that I will 
propose, Ghazālī holds that foundational knowledge can only be justified 
via actions that lead to transformative experiences.  
1. Introduction 
It is common to try to excite the curiosity of contemporary philosophers 
in Ghazālī’s skeptical argument in the Deliverance from Error [al-mun-
qidh min al-ḍalāl] (c. 1100) by highlighting its similarities with Descartes’ 
well-known skeptical arguments in the Discourse on Method (1637) and 
the Meditations on First Philosophy (1641).1 But not only this Cartesian-
inspired reading gets the argument of the Deliverance wrong, it also back-
fires quickly. Reading Ghazālī through the lens of the Cartesian Medita-
tions renders his solution to the skeptical challenge hopelessly fideist, 
 
1 Some commentators explain this alleged similarity by appealing to features of 
the genre of intellectual autobiography. Stephen Menn suggests that in this 
genre, the author presents a radical shift in worldview, and skeptical puzzles 
(like the dream argument) are natural and effective means to that end. On n 
Menn’s account, the basic structure of the genre can be traced back to Galen 
(129 -216 AD) (Menn 2003, 147). Others insist on a more direct historical linkage 
between Ghazālī and Descartes, alleging that the latter reproduced the argument 
of the former deliberately and without proper attribution. Catherine Wilson 
notes that V. V. Naumkin has found definite “proo” of the fact that Descartes 
had read Ghazālī’s Deliverance (Wilson 1996, 1022). Wilson cites Naumkin 
(1987). Mohammad Alwahaib notes that the source of Naumkin’s speculation is 
the work of the 20th century historian, Othman Al-Kaa’k, which was reported in 
Al-Ahram daily newspaper (Al-Kaa’k 1976). In the newspaper, Al-Kaa’k claims 
to have “visited the National Library in Paris and looked at the Cartesian Col-
lection, where he found a Latin translation of ‘Al-Monqith’ [Deliverance] with 
comments written in Descartes’ handwriting: “this will be added to our method” 
(Alwahaib 2017, 17). I have not seen a verification of this claim anywhere else. 
Ignacio Götz offers historical arguments to cast doubt on this simple textual 
transmission narrative. He speculates about a more complicated and perhaps 




and to that extent uninteresting for many of his contemporary readers. 
For instance, Catherine Wilson writes2:  
The parallel [of Ghazālī’s Deliverance] with Descartes’ Dis-
course on Method and the first two books of the Meditations is 
unmistakable; so too is the divergence: Descartes’s natural 
light leads not to fideism but to the exact sciences. (Wilson 
1996, 1820) 
Likewise, Muhammad Ali Khalidi writes:  
The parallels with Descartes’ intellectual crisis and bout of 
skepticism […] have often been noted. However, the similarity 
between the two accounts stops more or less at the point at 
which the two philosophers find themselves in a state of radical 
doubt. After that, Ghazālī’s solution may be regarded as fideist, 
while Descartes’ is plainly rationalist. (Khalidi 2005, xxvi) 
In this paper, I show that the most interesting aspects of Ghazālī’s en-
counter with skepticism have been obscured by this comparative frame-
work. I thus will try to focus on Ghazālī’s argument in the Deliverance in 
its own rights. My aim, however, is chiefly reconstructive.3 I try to show 
that from Ghazālī’s work we can extrapolate (a) an argument for a daunt-
ing form of radical skepticism, and (b) a non-intellectualist solution to 
this type of radical skepticism. is solution amounts to what I will call 
anti-skeptical transformative internalism: roughly, the view that we can 
overcome radical skepticism only by acting in certain ways, and thereby 
going through transformative experiences.        
 
2 Some recent commentators argue that Descartes and Ghazali face a similar 
skeptical problem, and offer a similar solution to it. Najm argues that “the two 
cases of dealing with the problem of doubt are profoundly comparable, and more 
significantly, that the solution of the problem of doubt is essentially the same” 
(Najm 1966). Omar Moad argues that the two philosophers are essentially con-
cerned with the same epistemological problem, namely, skepticism albeit with 
different “orientations” (Moad 2009, 92). Parvizian argues that Descartes and 
Ghazālī are concerned with the same problem, and their solution is similarly 
fideist (Parvizian Forthcoming). My attempt is in the opposite direction. I try to 
show that the problem of skepticism, and its solution is fundamentally different 
for Ghazali – and that it is philosophically interesting in its own right. 
3 Insofar as the purely historical aspects of this paper go, I am mostly in agree-
ment with Taneli Kukkonen’s excellent work in recent years (2016a; 2016b; 2012; 
2009). Whereas Kukkonen does a great job of placing Ghazali’s encounter with 
skepticism in the context of the Avicennian faculty psychology, my task is to 
provide an analytic reconstruction that can highlight the contemporary rele-
vance of Ghazali’s argument. I think this is valuable because many of the previ-
ous attempts at reconstruction come to Ghazali through the lenses of Cartesian 
skepticism, and to that extent get him wrong. I thus think of my task as compli-
mentary to the recent scholarly attempts by Kukkonen and others (e.g., Griffel 




In §2, I offer an exposition of Ghazālī’s first formulation of the problem 
of skepticism in the Deliverance. In §3, I reconstruct Ghazālī’s argument 
against skepticism by looking at his second encounter with skepticism 
towards the end of the Deliverance. I conclude by noting how these two 
encounters can shed light on each other.  
2. e First Encounter with Skepticism in the Deliv-
erance  
In the Deliverance, Ghazālī encounters skepticism not only in the well-
known first few pages of the book, but also later and prior to his experi-
mentation with mystical practices of Sufism. I argue that these two en-
counters with skepticism, albeit different in certain aspects, share some-
thing in common – as an indication, both crises are resolved by what 
Ghazālī calls the “divine light.” In this section, I offer an exposition of 
Ghazālī’s first encounter with skepticism and finish the section with an 
interpretative puzzle about his resolution of this skeptical episode. en, 
in §3, I go on to argue that we can beer understand Ghazālī’s enigmatic 
and abrupt resolution of the first skeptical episode by looking at his so-
lution to skepticism in the second instance.  
2.1. Some preliminary terms 
In what follows, I rely on two central concepts about epistemic justifica-
tion. First, I argue that the relevant form of skepticism that Ghazālī tack-
les questions the possibility of knowledge for internalist accounts of jus-
tification.4 And at this stage, I contrast this view with an externalist ac-
count of justification. I use internalism as a theory of epistemic justifica-
tion that demarcates the domain of possible knowledge: 
INTERNALISM: S can know p only if p can be arrived at by 
subjecting S’s feasibly accessible epistemic reasons to ra-
tional inquiry.5   
As I use the term, e is an epistemic reason for S only if e is a fact (about 
the world, or about S’s best theory of the world) that favors p.6 In other 
 
4 Compare this with a weaker form of skepticism which admits that knowledge 
is possible but denies its actuality. 
5 My formulation of internalism in the epistemic case reflects the formulation 
we often find in debates about internalism with respect to having a reason in 
practical matters (Williams 1979) 
6 One’s epistemic reasons can include both evidential facts from perception, 
memory, imagination, etc. and non-evidential facts about theory virtues, one’s 
conceptual framework, etc. For our purposes, we can stay neutral on questions 
about the relation between evidential and non-evidential epistemic reasons. For 
instance, it may be true that all non-evidential epistemic reasons are ultimately 




words then, internalism sets two conditions on the possibility of 
knowledge. We can know p only if: 
 [Favoring] the set of facts that are feasibly accessible to us fa-
vor p, and  
 [Derivability] this favoring relation between the set of feasibly 
accessible facts and p can be uncovered by us via rational in-
quiry. 
According to this form of internalism, p falls out of the domain of S’s 
possible knowledge if either p is not favored by the facts that are feasibly 
accessible to S, or p cannot be rationally derived from S’s feasibly acces-
sible epistemic reasons. In either of these cases, all else being equal, the 
internalist would prescribe skepticism towards p for S.7   
By contrast, epistemic externalism denies that the possibility of 
knowledge depends on our access to the relevant body of epistemic rea-
sons, or on our ability to derive the right conclusion from the right body 
of epistemic reasons. In other words, epistemic reasons, on the external-
ist account, are not defined in terms of an accessibility relation. To be 
sure, for most externalists, too, there must be a basing relation – 
knowledge is more than lucky true belief. So, on their account, S knows 
p only if p is based on the relevant epistemic reason e. But there is no 
requirement that S must be in any way in position to be aware of e; nor 
is there a requirement that S must be in any way in position to be able to 
derive p from e. For example, on the externalist account, the relation be-
tween the basis of knowledge and the state of knowing can be a reliable 
causal relationship that the agent herself is not even in position to be 
aware of. 
2.2. e First Skeptical Argument of the Deliverance  
In what follows, I divide Ghazālī’s first encounter with skepticism into 
three steps: (a) the setup, (b) the skeptical argument, and (c) the resolu-
tion.8  
a. Setup (1): Initial doubt 
Ghazālī initiates the skeptical episode with a simple expression of philo-
sophical awakening.9 Invoking a famous saying from prophet 
 
7 I say “all else being equal” because one could hold that we do not have any 
epistemic grounds to believe in p, and yet hold that we should continue believing 
in p on practical grounds.  
8 Along the way, I flag some of the similarities and differences between Des-
cartes and Ghazali. On my reading, while they do share quite a bit in the first 
stage (setup), their paths radically diverge after that.  
9 As many have noted, a very similar kind of philosophical awakening can be 
seen in Descartes. The references that I have listed in footnote 3 are relevant, 





Muhammad, he notes that “inherited beliefs lost their hold” on him when 
he observed that, 
[…] the children of Christians always grew up embracing 
Christianity, and the children of Jews always grew up adhering 
to Judaism, and the children of Muslims always grew up fol-
lowing the religion of Islam. (Al-Ghazālī 2006, 19) 
He notes that this conformist method of acquiring beliefs is contrary to 
the dictates of a “natural disposition” [fiṭra]10 for knowledge.  “Conse-
quently,” he writes: 
I felt an urge to seek the true meaning of the original fiṭra, and 
the true meaning of the beliefs arising through mere conform-
ism [taqlīd] to parents and teachers. I wanted to sift out these 
uncritical beliefs, the beginning of which are suggestions im-
posed from without [talqīnāt], since there are differences of 
opinion in the discernment of those that are true from those 
that are false. (Al-Ghazālī 2006, 20; emphasis added)  
I think that Ghazālī’s initial worries with the conformist methods of ac-
quiring beliefs indicate an initial commitment to internalism. He starts 
by highlighting a contrast between “beliefs that are imposed from with-
out” and beliefs that are examined and endorsed by a critical reflection 
“from within.” He then casts a shadow of doubt over his beliefs because 
they are given to him through external mechanisms that are opaque to 
him. Aer all, he will go on to argue that many of his beliefs about Islam 
are indeed true. However, here, he voices the worry that these beliefs, in 
their current state, are in tension with the healthy disposition for 
knowledge precisely because he is not in position to recognize their 
ground. Later, when I reject the simple fideist reading of Ghazālī’s solu-
tion to skepticism, I will return to this point, and analyze his approach to 
internalism more carefully.     
b. Setup (2): Indubitability Criterion 
Aer casting a shadow of general suspicion over his beliefs, Ghazālī rec-
ognizes the need to specify a criterion for suspension of judgment: Under 
what conditions should we suspend judgment?   
Ghazālī responds by specifying a set of demanding conditions for 
certain knowledge.11 He writes (bracketed numbers are mine): 
 
10 It is difficult to find an exact translation for fiṭra. Other suggestions are “tem-
perament”, “constitution” , “what is in man at his creation”, etc. (Al-Ghazālī 2006, 
85–86, n. 22)   
11 Descartes, too, takes an almost identical step, and defines a indubitability cri-
terion for knowledge (Descartes 1996, 12 (18)). However, arguably, Descartes’s 





… I began by saying to myself: “What I seek is knowledge of 
the true meaning of things. Of necessity, therefore, I must in-
quire into just what the true meaning of knowledge is.” Then it 
became clear to me that [i] sure and certain knowledge is that 
in which the thing known is made so manifest that no doubt 
clings to it, [ii] nor is it accompanied by the possibility [imkān] 
of error and deception, [iii] nor can the mind even suppose 
such a possibility […] [E]very knowledge unaccompanied by 
safety from error is not sure and certain knowledge. (Al-Ghazālī 
2006, 20; emphasis added) 
In other words, we can claim with certainty that we know p only if:  
[i] [actual-certainty] we actually have no doubt about p,  
[ii] [modal-certainty] we cannot doubt p, and  
[iii] [proof-certainty] we can positively establish the impossibil-
ity of doubting p. 
Admiedly, Ghazālī’s formulation of proof-certainty in the above pas-
sage is vague. However, as we will see below, both Ghazālī’s Argument 
from Illusion and the Dream Argument make sense only if we aribute 
this demanding third condition to him. Since actual-certainty is entailed 
by satisfying either modal-certainty or proof-certainty, I will only focus 
on the laer two conditions. In short then, what Ghazālī calls the condi-
tion of “safety [‘amān] from error”12 can be summarized as encompass-
ing a modal condition on knowledge, and a proof condition on that mo-
dality.  
Finally, it is worth noting that these are conditions on certain 
knowledge. At this point in the text, Ghazālī is seeking a foundation for 
all knowledge. Accordingly, the standard of success is that much stricter 
because this is the highest possible epistemic achievement. e same 
standard may not apply to ordinary subsequent beliefs.  
c. Setup (3): e Source Hypotheses 
Initially, Ghazālī seems to accept two hypotheses about possible sources 
of knowledge and their normative structure13: 
TWO-SOURCES : There are two sources of knowledge, sensa-
tion and reason. 
 
12 Ghazālī’s conception of “safety” (as either the impossibility of doubt or as hav-
ing a positive proof for the impossibility of doubt) is much more demanding than 
the contemporary usage of “safety” in epistemology. For example, on one ver-
sion of Williamson’s influential account, ‘safety’ amounts to immunity from be-
ing “easily” wrong (2000, 147). 
13 Descartes, too, accepts both hypotheses. For his endorsement of Two-Sources, 
see (Descartes 1996, 26-27 (37-39)). For Trickle-Down, see (Descartes 1996, 12 




TRICKLE-DOWN : If a source of knowledge S is not immune 
from doubt, then all claims to knowledge based on S are not 
immune from doubt. 
Ghazālī’s relationship to the Source Hypotheses is complicated. Initially, 
when he sets up the skeptical challenge, he does seem to endorse both 
hypotheses: 
Now that despair has befallen me, the only hope I have of ac-
quiring an insight into obscure matters is to start from things 
that are perfectly clear, namely sense-data and self-evident 
truths [of reason] […] Is my reliance on sense-data and […] self-
evident truths [of reason] […] a verifiable safety containing no 
deception or danger? (Al-Ghazālī 2006, 21) 
As we will see, aer showing that sensibility and reason are not immune 
from doubt, he concludes that no beliefs based on sensibility and reason 
are immune from doubt. us, he accepts TRICKLE-DOWN. I see no indi-
cation that he will ever revise this commitment. 
However, Ghazālī’s relation to TWO-SOURCES is complicated. In-
itially, he seems to endorse TWO-SOURCES because first he argues that 
reason and sensibility are not immune from doubt; and then he concludes 
that none of his claims to knowledge is immune from doubt. But this in-
ference could be valid only if he were commied to TWO-SOURCES. So, 
initially he accepts the thesis. But as we will see, as part of his solution 
to the skeptical challenge, he will revise this commitment. 
    
d. Skeptical Argument (1): Outline 
Aer seing the stage up by indicating his commitment to internalism 
about epistemic justification, and the Source Hypohteses, Ghazālī’s ar-
gument to radical skepticism takes three steps: 
1. Argument from Illusion 
2. Dream Argument 
3. Internalist Circle 
On the assumption that the claims of the setup are true: first, the Argu-
ment form Illusion establishes that sensation is not a reliable source of 
certain knowledge. Second, the Dream Argument poses a challenge to 
prove the impossibility of doubting reason as a reliable source of certain 
knowledge. And third, the Internalist Circle establishes that this proof 
cannot be given. 
In Ghazālī’s view, these arguments suffice to establish genuine 
radical doubt. at is, given the assumptions of the setup, Ghazālī holds 
that we end up in a position where we should suspend all judgment. No-




threatening than it is for Descartes.14 Consequently, Ghazālī’s solution 
to radical doubt is going to be more revisionist than Descartes’ relatively 
conservative solution. Descartes’ solution is conservative in that he does 
not think that in order to answer skepticism, we need to revise our com-
mitment to internalism or the Source Hypotheses (both of each, Des-
cartes seems to also endorse). Ghazālī, on the other hand, revises both 
these commitments from the setup.15 
e. Skeptical Argument (2): Argument from Illusion   
e first argument is meant to show that sensation, as one of the two 
sources of knowledge, is not immune from doubt.  To establish this point, 
Ghazālī considers both cases where sensation malfunctions according to 
its own proper functioning, and cases where sensation does everything 
according to its norms and yet fails to represent reality. Sensory illusions 
are examples of the first kind (e.g., when one “looks at a star and sees it 
as something small, the size of a dinar” (Al-Ghazālī 2006, 21; C.f. Aristotle 
1984, 1.[25])). But he oen puts more emphasis on the laer cases because 
they show that some aspects of reality are essentially inaccessible to the 
faculty of sensation. An ordinary example of the laer case is this: 
[The sense of sight] looks at a shadow and sees it standing 
still and motionless and judges that motion must be denied. 
Then, due to experience and observation an hour later it 
knows that the shadow is moving, and that it did not move 
in a sudden spurt, but so gradually and imperceptibly that it 
was never completely at rest. (Al-Ghazālī 2006, 21)   
So, where sensation can only see standstill shadows, reason can construct 
the slowly moving object. e slowly moving object is an object of 
knowledge that falls out of the domain of possible knowledge for sensa-
tion.16 In the background, he is working with a traditional method for 
demarcation of different psychological faculties. As he notes in the De-
liverance:  
Man gets his information about the “worlds” by means of per-
ception. Each one of his kinds of perception is created in order 
that man may get to know thereby a “world” of the existents — 
 
14 Descartes’s skeptical argument takes us to a state that provisionally looks like 
a state of radical doubt. But, famously, he denies that he can actually doubt eve-
rything he assents to. In particular, he cannot doubt his belief that he exists, etc. 
15 Of course, that is not to say that Ghazālī’s skepticism is more radical than 
Descartes’ in every respect. For example, as Moad points out, Ghazālī does not 
seem particularly concerned with external world skepticism (Moad 2009).    
16 A more sustained discussion can be found in the Niche of Light, where he lists 




and by “worlds” we mean the categories of existing things. (Al-
Ghazālī 2006, 59).  
He then goes on to identifies several faculties of “perception”, e.g., sen-
sation, reason, and prophecy. Each faculty is a distinct faculty of percep-
tion in that it gives us information about distinct kinds of objects in the 
world – as he puts it, each faculty “perceives certain classes of existents” 
(Ibid.). So, for instance, where sensation is needed to perceive concrete 
physical objects, it has no access to the universals. In other words then, 
there is a correspondence between Ghazālī’s ontology of kinds of objects 
and his faculty-psychology: different psychological faculties are postu-
lated as perceiving instruments for different kinds of objects.17 
Now, I think we can appreciate the force of Ghazālī’s Argument 
from Illusion even quite independently from the metaphysical assump-
tions of his faculty-psychology. e argument relies on two premises. 
First, as we just saw, Ghazālī notes occasional errors and limitations of 
sensible judgment. And second, he notes that to be safe from the possi-
bility of these errors we need to rely on reason. From these two consid-
erations, he concludes that sensation on its own cannot be the ground of 
certain knowledge. But is this a good argument? 
Initially, one might worry that the unreliability of a limited sub-
set of sensory experiences may not cast doubt on the deliverances of sen-
sory experiences wholesale. is is especially a likely objection for those 
who come to Ghazālī aer reading Descartes. In the Meditation, Des-
cartes, too, points to occasional sensory illusions. However, he is quick 
to note that sensory illusions make only a small subset of sense-percep-
tions: “there are many other beliefs about which doubt is quite impossi-
ble, even though they are derived from the senses – for example, that I 
am here, siing by the fire” (Descartes 1996, 12-13 (18)). Of course, Des-
cartes does not hold that sensation is the foundation of all knowledge, 
either. However, he does not think that sensory illusions suffice to estab-
lish this point. So, is Ghazālī simply oblivious to this Cartesian observa-
tion?  
I do not think so, because Ghazālī’s argument relies on a concep-
tion of the indubitability criterion that he does not share with Des-
cartes18: for Ghazālī, sensibility is safe only if we can positively prove 
that it is impossible to doubt its deliverances. But judgments based on 
sensation, he holds, cannot provide this kind of proof. To see why, first, 
consider how he states the conclusion of his Argument from Illusion: 
In the case of this and of similar instances of sensation, the 
judging-sense makes its judgments, but the judging-reason 
 
17 For a discussion of Ghazali’s faculty psychology and especially its relation to 
the Avicennian orthodoxy see Trieger (2012) and Kukkonen (2012). 
18 As I noted in footnote 12, while Descartes seems to endorse the modal-cer-





refutes it and repeatedly gives it the lie in an incontrovertible 
fashion. (Al-Ghazālī 2006, 21; translation modified)  
Unlike Descartes, Ghazālī holds that sensation makes its own judg-
ments.19 For example, sensation makes the judgment that a star above is 
smaller than a dinar. But then, reason comes in via “geometrical proofs”, 
and “demonstrate that [the star] surpasses the earth in size” (Al-Ghazālī 
2006, 21). I read Ghazālī’s anthropomorphic language of “the judging-
sense says x” to mean this: were we to make a judgment by relying on 
the rules and information of sensation alone, we would say x.  (And I 
apply the same model to his anthropomorphic language of “the judging-
reason says x.”)  us, for Ghazālī, the main conclusion of the Argument 
from Illusion is this: Were we to make a judgment by relying on the rules 
and information of sensation alone, our judgment would not be safe. at 
is so, because when sensation delivers a judgment there is always the 
possibility that this judgment is in the subset of sensible judgments that 
are false. But safety, in Ghazālī’s narrow sense, requires a positive proof 
that it is impossible for this particular judgment of sensation to be false. 
However, this further proof, he claims, must be made by relying on rules 
and information of reason.  
But can we not rely on sensation to correct our false sensible 
judgments? For example, I see a broken stick in water. I take the stick 
out, and now see that the stick is not broken. Have I not corrected my 
false sensible judgment by relying on another sensible judgment? 
I think Ghazālī’s claim is that in these cases, as far as information 
and rules of sensation are concerned, we are delivered two sensible judg-
ments that are on the same footing: first, our sensible judgment is that 
the stick is broken, and second, our sensible judgment is that the stick is 
not broken. But since on pain of contradiction both cannot be true, we 
need to adjudicate between these two sensible judgments, and that the 
adjudication between these sensible judgments is le to reason. 
A similar argument is developed by Ghazālī himself in the Niche 
of Light [Mishkāt al-Anwār] (wrien in around the same time as the De-
liverance).20 Here, he notes that sensation can see other objects but it 
“cannot see itself, while the rational faculty perceives other things and 
its own aributes” (Al-Ghazālī 1998, 6). e idea seems to be this: sensa-
tion cannot take a reflective stance on itself. As long as we rely on rules 
and information of sensibility alone, all episodes of sensation are on par. 
However, reason has the capacity to reflect on the judgments of sensation 
and its own judgments, and adjudicate among them: I can run through 
 
19 Descartes’ view on this issue is complicated. He does hold that sensation pro-
duces its own representations or ‘ideas’ (Descartes 1996, 27 (39)). However, he 
denies that just by producing ideas, sensation also judges them to be true. On 
his account, it is a further act of will to accept or reject ideas that are brought 
about by sensation (Descartes 1996, 39 (56)). 
20 The exact date of neither book is known. But they are both written towards 




my thoughts, find an inconsistency, and reject it. In this sense, he insists 
that reason is a “higher” faculty of knowledge.      
In short then, for Ghazālī, we cannot arrive at certain knowledge 
if we base our judgments on sensation because every time we make a 
judgment based on sensation, a task is le for us, namely to inquire 
whether from the standpoint of reason, that sensible judgment with-
stands scrutiny and tests of consistency with other judgments. Of course, 
in ordinary cases we do not need absolute certainty, and thus we oen 
just rely on sensible judgments. But, Ghazālī’s claim is that when sensa-
tion is called upon to be the certain foundation of all knowledge, then it 
must be in position to provide judgments that are provably safe. We 
could verify judgments of sensation via sensation if rules and mecha-
nisms of sensation were not opaque to the standpoint of sensation. How-
ever, as the examples of perceptual illusion and limitation are meant to 
show, that is not the case. Sensation is incapable of such reflective adju-
dications. us, since sensation cannot establish its own certainty (i.e., 
prove the impossibility of doubting its claims), it cannot be the founda-
tional source of knowledge. erefore, unlike its Cartesian counterpart, 
Ghazālī’s Argument from Illusions is meant to cast doubt on sensation 
wholesale.    
f. Skeptical Argument (3): Dream Argument 
Ghazālī introduces the Dream Argument by imagining a comeback on 
behalf of sensation aer its dismissal in the Argument from Illusion: 
The sense-data spoke up: “What assurance have you that reli-
ance on rational data is not like your reliance on sense-data? 
Indeed, you used to have confidence in me. Then the reason-
judge came along and gave me the lie. Were it not for the rea-
son judge, you would still accept me as true. So there may be, 
beyond the perception of reason, another judge. And if the lat-
ter revealed itself, it would give the lie to the judgments of rea-
son. … The mere fact of the nonappearance of that further per-
ception does not prove the impossibility of its existence. (Al-
Ghazālī 2006, 22) 
e last sentence of this passage utilizes the most demanding aspect of 
Ghazālī’s Indubitability Criterion once more: namely, the demand for 
proof-certainty. Reason is now being challenged to offer a positive proof 
that there cannot be another faculty which could undermine reason’s 
judgments in much the same way that rational reflection can undermine 
some sensible judgments. He then continues: 
[W]hile everything you believe through sensation or intellec-
tion in your waking state may be true in relation to that state, 
what assurance have you that you may not suddenly experi-
ence a state which would have the same relation to your wak-
ing state as the latter has to your dreaming, and your waking 
state would be dreaming in relation to that new and further 




that all your rational beliefs were unsubstantial fancies. (Al-
Ghazālī 2006, 22; emphasis added) 
Unlike its Cartesian counterpart, Ghazālī’s Dream Argument thus targets 
reason as the foundation for certain knowledge.21 e chief claim is this: 
the proof-certainty condition requires a positive proof for the impossi-
bility of doubt. For the sake of argument, Ghazālī is happy to grant that 
rational principles are consistent and transparent: so, from the stand-
point of reason, we seem to be able to adjudicate among our judgments, 
and even be certain that this or that judgment corresponds to rational 
rules, while the others do not. But this only passes the buck, for how can 
we acquire certainty that our rational principles are the right ones? e 
paragraph that immediately follows the above passage raises this worry 
by noting that the possibility of a third source of knowledge (in addition 
to reason and sensibility) has not been ruled out:  
It may be that this state beyond reason is that which the Sufis 
claim is theirs. For they allege that, in the states they experi-
ence when they concentrate inwardly and suspend sensation, 
they see phenomenon which are not in accord with normal data 
of reason. (Al-Ghazālī 2006, 22–23; emphasis added) 
In other words, although, for Ghazālī, the Argument from Illusion estab-
lishes that sensation cannot be the foundation for certain knowledge, the 
Dream Argument only raises a challenge: namely, the challenge of posi-
tively proving that basic rational principles cannot be undermined by any 
other standpoint (e.g., the standpoint of mystic experiences of the Sufis 
which are “not in accord with normal data of reason”). is takes us to 
the final step of the skeptical argument: Can we positively prove that 
those other nonrational standpoints (e.g., of mystic experiences) cannot 
undermine our rational judgments? 
g. Skeptical Argument (4): e Internalist Circle 
Ghazālī considers and answers the above question negatively: 
When these thoughts occurred to me they penetrated my soul, 
and so I tried to deal with that objection. However, my effort 
was unsuccessful, since the objection could be refuted only by 
proof. But the only way to put together a proof was to combine 
primary cognition. So if, as in my case, these were inadmissible, 
it was impossible to construct the proof. (Al-Ghazālī 2006, 23) 
 
21 Notably, Descartes’ Dream Argument does not cast any doubts on the deliv-
erance of reason. “For whether I am awake or asleep,” he writes, “two and three 
added together are five” (Descartes 1996, 14 (20)). Rather, for Descartes, the 
Dream Argument targets the authority of sensation. As we saw, unlike Descartes 
does not think that the Argument from Illusion undermines the authority of 
sensation wholesale, and he thus presents the Dream Argument as a further ar-




Here is one way to illustrate the force of this argument: We want to know 
whether there is a standpoint beyond reason which can undermine it. 
e Argument from Illusion has already shown that while reason can 
undermine sensation, sensation cannot undermine reason. So, if we could 
show that the TWO SOURCES is true, it would follow that there is no other 
source of knowledge beyond reason which could undermine it. Hence, 
all we need to block the path to skepticism is to prove that TWO SOURCES 
is safe: i.e., to prove that it is impossible to doubt the TWO SOURCES. Can 
we do that? 
Ghazālī argues that on pain of circularity we cannot prove the 
impossibility of doubting the TWO SOURCES. is argument goes through 
only if we aribute Internalism about epistemic justification to Ghazālī. 
Given Internalism, the only way to establish that TWO SOURCES holds is 
to derive it from some feasibly available epistemic reasons. But any such 
derivation, Ghazālī claims, would have to rely on some “primary cogni-
tion” [‘ulūm ‘awwaliyy]. In the Deliverance, Ghazālī calls these primary 
cognitions the “data of reason” [al-'aqliyyat] (Al-Ghazālī 2006, 22). 
Roughly speaking, primary cognition stands for foundational rational 
propositions and concepts.22 In the Aims of Philosophers [Al-Maqāsīd al-
Falāsifa], we can find a more descriptive definition: 
Every conception and assent is divided into that which is pri-
marily comprehended without investigation and reflection [i.e. 
primary cognition] and that which would not be acquired un-
less one investigated [i.e. acquired cognition]. (Al-Ghazālī 2000, 
12; my translation) 23  
 
22 To be more precise, Ghazali accepts the basic Avicennian framework that all 
cognition (or, knowledge) is either an assent or conception. In the background 
we have Avicenna’s formulation: “Assenting comes about only by means of syl-
logism (qiyās) and whatever is like it” (Avicenna 2010, 3). He then adds: “Con-
ception [taṣawwur] is knowledge that comes first and is acquired by means of 
definition (ḥadd) and whatever is like it”  (Avicenna 2010, 3; translation modi-
fied). Conceptions “comes first” in that they have a primacy over assents. That 
is, the capacity to use concepts is presupposed in making any assent. As Avi-
cenna puts it elsewhere, “every assent is accompanied by a conception [taṣaw-
wur], but not the converse” (Avicenna, Madkhal, 17.10-17, as translated in Black 
1990, 74). Likewise, in the Deliverance, Ghazālī asserts that knowledge is either 
an assent or a conception (Al-Ghazālī 2006, 34). He then defines assenting as a 
kind of knowledge where “the way to know something is through demonstra-
tion or proof [al-burhān]” (Al-Ghazālī 2006, 34; translation modified).  He then 
adds that conception [taṣawwur] is the other form of knowledge where “the way 
to know it is the definition [ḥadd]” (Al-Ghazālī 2006, 34; translation modified). 
Elsewhere, he also accepts the primacy of conception over assent (Al-Ghazālī 
1952, 8 (4b)). These terms, the associated distinction between primary and ac-
quired cognition, can be traced back at least to ‘Uyūn al-Masā’il [The Sources of 
Questions] that is attributed to al-Farābi (Wolfson 1943, 115–16). 




To look at his examples, primary “assents” (roughly, propositional 
knowledge) include knowing that “ings equal to the same thing are 
equal to each other.” And primary “conceptions” (roughly, knowledge of 
concepts24) include knowing concepts like ‘things’ and ‘being’. Our 
knowledge of these concepts and propositions are “primary” in that we 
do not acquire them through ‘rational investigation’– rather, knowing 
them is a necessary condition for the possibility of any use of reason. In 
Book I of the Revival of the Religious Sciences [Iḥyā′ ‘Ulūm al-Dīn], he 
identifies at least a subset of primary cognition as innate knowledge in 
that he calls it a type of “knowledge that comes into being in the dispo-
sition of a child” (Al-Ghazālī 2016, 255). 
Now, the Internalist Circle exploits the fact that every derivation 
must rely on some primary cognition. In particular, Ghazālī claims that 
any rational argument to prove TWO SOURCES would have to rely on some 
primary conception. at is so because that proof would presumably in-
clude some assent (roughly, propositional knowledge), and any assent 
relies on some primary conceptions.  As Ghazālī writes: 
Every assent is necessarily preceded by two conception. For 
example, unless we understand ‘world’ and its definition and 
‘create’ and its definition, we cannot assert that the world was 
created. (Al-Ghazālī 2000, 12; my translation) 
Ghazālī’s skeptical challenge is then this: Any derivation of the claim that 
there is no standpoint beyond reason must rely on concepts that are 
merely presupposed from the standpoint of reason (i.e., it must rely on 
primary concepts of reason). us, any such argument must simply pre-
suppose that our claims to knowing the primary concepts and primary 
propositions are themselves safe. But if so, any aempt to prove the 
safety of the TWO SOURCES would succeed only if we could prove the 
safety of our primary concepts. Evidently then, any rational proof of the 
safety of primary concepts of reason would be hopelessly circular: be-
cause it will have to rely on those very concepts. 
In short, the Indubitability Criterion demands a positive proof 
that reason cannot be doubted. We need this positive proof because, as 
Ghazālī puts it, “[t]he mere fact of the nonappearance of that further […] 
[standpoint] does not prove the impossibility of its existence” (Al-Ghazālī 
2006, 22) (i.e., he demands the satisfaction of what I called proof-cer-
tainty). However, given Internalism, any such proof must rely on some 
primary cognition that seems certain from the standpoint of reason. is 
is circular.25  
 
24 There are at least two ways to understand the expression “knowing a concept”: 
First, knowing how to use a concept, say, in patterns of inference. Second, know-
ing the definition of a concept. Ghazali does identify primary conception with 
“understanding the definition” of a concept (Al-Ghazālī 2006, 34; 2000, 12).  
25 Arguably, the argument is similar to the Pyrrhonian problem of criterion (Sex-




h. Radical Doubt 
Ghazālī’s reflections on the Source Hypothesis, internalism, and the In-
dubitability Criterion results in radical doubt. He holds that reason can-
not establish its own authority. Given his original aim to find a founda-
tion for knowledge that is certain, skepticism seems warranted. Immedi-
ately aer offering the Internalist Circle argument, he writes: 
This malady was mysterious and it lasted for nearly two 
months. During that time I was a skeptic in fact, but not in ut-
terance and doctrine. (Al-Ghazālī 2006, 23) 
Notably, he characterizes this skeptical episode in terms of a “malady”. 
Below, as we will see, he will characterize the solution to skepticism in 
terms of “regaining health and equilibrium,” too. 
2.3. Ghazālī’s “Resolution” of the first skeptical episode: a puzzle 
As I noted earlier, many commentators have characterized Ghazālī’s so-
lution to skepticism as simply “fideist”.26 To be fair, at first sight, the anti-
skeptical “argument” of the Deliverance looks astonishingly abrupt and 
simple: 
At length God Most High cured me of that sickness. My soul 
regained its health and equilibrium and once again I accepted 
the self-evident data of reason and relied on them with safety 
and certainty. But that was not achieved by constructing a 
proof or putting together an argument. On the contrary, it was 
the effect of a light which God Most High cast into my breast. 
And that light is the key to most knowledge. (Al-Ghazālī 2006, 
23) 
e passage seems to suggest that a particular act of grace resolved the 
skeptical challenge. If this is right, Ghazālī’s solution to skepticism is in-
deed merely fideist, and thus philosophically uninteresting unless we ac-
cepted the required theological assumptions. But I think this reading is 
textually misguided. 
First, it is important to read the above passage about God’s grace in light 
of the passage that immediately follows: 
Therefore, whoever thinks that the unveiling [kashf] of truth 
depends on precisely formulated proofs has indeed strained the 
broad mercy of God. […] The Apostle … said: ‘God Most High 
created men in darkness, then sprinkled on them some of His 
light.’ From that light, then, the unveiling of truth must be 
sought. (Al-Ghazālī 2006, 23–24; emphasis added) 
e “light” which resolves the skeptical challenge is one that reflects “the 
broad mercy” of God. “Broad mercy” [raḥma wāsa] is a r’anic term, 
 




referring to God’s grace that encompasses everything, at least insofar as 
they actively seek God’s grace.27 e light is thus a feature that is avail-
able to all persons were they to seek it. erefore, the passage that im-
mediately follows Ghazālī’s puzzling resolution of skepticism should give 
us a pause to consider the philosophical promise of his account: What 
general features of human psychology (or, “soul”) represent the light 
which can take us out of the state of radical doubt? 
Secondly, on the simple fideist reading, the “light” that restores the au-
thority of reason functions like a brute causal force that “imposes a belief 
from without.” is must be puzzling given how the initial doubt was 
motivated: He wanted to make sure that he knows the ground of his be-
liefs because otherwise, even if they were true, his beliefs did not amount 
to knowledge. So, how could he resolve the skeptical challenge by relying 
on a “light” that is just induced in him by an external force? Put simply, 
how can he know that the source of this light is God, instead of a Demon 
Deceiver? 
Now, an advocate of the simple fideist interpretation could complicate 
their story and reply: 
[Externalist reading]: Ghazālī starts the Deliverance by as-
suming internalism. He shows that internalism results in rad-
ical doubt. He thus drops the internalist assumption, and 
adopts externalism. So, although God’s light is an external 
source of justification (in that, as a source of knowledge, it is 
opaque to the knower), we can rely on it and legitimately make 
claims to knowledge. 
Aer all, the view that I will aribute to Ghazālī has a similar shape: I 
will argue that he starts the book with one account of justification and 
the skeptical challenge persuades him to revise that account. 
However, I think the externalist reading does not fit well with the rest of 
the Deliverance. In particular, I want to highlight Ghazālī’s argument 
against Ta’līmism just a few pages later in the text. e term stands for a 
subgroup of Shia Muslims, and Ghazālī has a complicated historical rela-
tionship with them.28 For our purposes, it is enough to focus on his chief 
philosophical argument against them. In the Deliverance, he identifies the 
main doctrine of Ta’līmism in the following way: 
 
27 “I cause My Punishment to smite whomsoever I will, though My Mercy en-
compasses all things [raḥmati wāsat]. I shall prescribe it for those who are rev-
erent, and give alms, and those who believe in Our signs” Quran (Nasar 2017, 
7:156) 
28 He argues against Ta’līmism in more details in Al-Ghazālī, The Just Balance 
[Al-Qistās Al-Mustaqīm]. For an overview of Ghazālī’s relationship to Ta’līmists 




[They hold that] there must be authoritative teaching and an 
authoritative teacher, and also […] that not every teacher is 
suitable, but that there must be an infallible teacher. (Al-
Ghazālī 2006, 44) 
e theory plays a twofold dialectical role in the context of the book: on 
the one hand, Ta’līmists are represented as those who are sympathetic to 
skepticism against the authority of ordinary human reason and sensa-
tion. On the other hand, they try to solve the problem by relying on an 
“authoritative teacher,” i.e. a religious leader or imām.   
In response to them, Ghazālī emphasizes that there are possible 
false teachers. Either we must accept the authority of any teacher that 
comes our way, or we must have a reliable way of telling a false teacher 
from a true one. e former solution does not contradict the externalist 
reading, but it also does not seem to result in safe knowledge. Ghazālī 
insists that the possibility of false teachers is a real problem, and thus he 
rejects this horn of the dilemma. 
e second horn of the dilemma requires having a method to tell 
a true teacher from a false one. But to know whether a teacher is author-
itative or not, one needs to know the character of the teacher. e laer 
knowledge is never safe. He concludes that authoritative teachers cannot 
be the fundamental source of knowledge: 
The Apostle of God […] even said: ‘I judge by externals, but 
God undertakes to judge the hears of men.’ This means: ‘I judge 
according to the most probable opinion resulting from the wit-
nesses’ statements, but they may err about the matter. The 
prophets had no way to be safe from error in such cases involv-
ing personal judgment; how, then, can anyone else aspire to 
such safety? (Al-Ghazālī 2006, 46) 
Notably, this is not an isolated aack on Ta’līmism. 29  Ghazālī is equally 
concerned with the problem of false prophets. As Frank Griffel has force-
fully argued, Ghazālī maintains that we can tell a false prophet from a 
true one by relying on our “theoretical knowledge about the effects of a 
prophet’s work” (Griffel 2004, 142). For example, following the teachings 
of a true prophet leads to a flourishing life, while following a false 
 
29 In the Just Balance (1978, 6–7), Ghazālī seems to adopt an inconsistent position 
by accepting the authority of Prophet Muhammad as a fundamental source of 
knowledge. However, firstly, in the Deliverance, he describes the Just Balance as 
“an independent work aimed at explaining the scale for weighing knowledge 
and showing that he who fully understands it has no need for an infallible Imam” 
(Al-Ghazālī 2006, 49–50; emphasis added). So, it seems that Ghazālī’s own read-
ing of the Just Balance is compatibile with his internalist commitments in the 
Deliverance. Secondly, it is important to note that in the Just Balance, he treats 
the teaching of the Prophet as an additional source of certainty. After stating his 
independent standards of knowledge, he notes: “to this [standard of knowledge] 
I add the fact that I know its author [God] and the one who teaches it [Gabriel] 




prophet leads to misery. us, on his account, we can tell a false prophet 
from a true one by looking at the relation between their teaching and 
human flourishing. But at this point, I am not interested in Ghazālī argu-
ment against Ta’līmism per se, or his view of verifying a true prophet. 
Rather, I want to highlight that throughout the Deliverance (and in his 
other works on prophecy), he remains commied to the idea that unless 
one can recognize the ground of one’s judgment, one may not make a 
claim to certain knowledge. us, Ghazālī seems to remain commied to 
the basic tenets of internalism for the remainder of the Deliverance.30 In 
a memorable passage he writes: 
[…] there can be no desire to return to servile conformism once 
it has been abandoned, since a prerequisite for being a servile 
conformist is that one does not know himself to be such. But 
when a man recognizes that, the glass of his servile conform-
ism is shattered – an irreparable fragmentation and a mess 
which cannot be mended by patching and piecing together: it 
can only be melted by fire and newly reshaped. (Al-Ghazālī 
2006, 25) 
As we saw, Ghazālī’s problem with servile conformism is that it commits 
one to “uncritical beliefs, the beginning of which are suggestions im-
posed from without” (Al-Ghazālī 2006, 20). us, we must read Ghazālī 
as either inconsistent (in criticizing his opponents with internalist stand-
ards that he fails to meet in answering skepticism, and more importantly, 
in developing his account of verifying a true prophet); or as having a 
conception of God’s light as a solution to skepticism which does not re-
duce it to a brute causal force that imposes a belief on the seeker of 
knowledge “from outside.”  
What follows is wrien in the spirit of curiosity to see if we can 
read Ghazālī in a more charitable manner. In a sense, the following aims 
to answer a textual puzzle: What, according to Ghazālī, is the feature of 
human psychology that corresponds to a divine “light” which we can 
employ to overcome skepticism? 
 
 
30 For similar reasons, Anthony Booth attributes what he calls Moderate Anti-
Evidentialism to Ghazālī: “For all except one proposition, S ought to believe that 
p for non-epistemic reasons” (Booth 2018, 122). On Booth’s reading, Ghazālī is 
an evidentialist only with respect to a single belief which identifies a true 
prophet. Unfortunately, I do not have the space to engage with Booth’s account 
here. I just quickly note that the skeptical challenge of the beginning of the De-
liverance cannot be resolved by identifying the true prophet via an ordinary ev-
idential route either. After all, the Internalist Circle blocks all evidential reason-
ing. So, even if we accept Booth’s account, Ghazālī must offer a modified version 
of evidentialism for the exceptional case of belief about true prophet. Some of 
Booth’s later remarks indicate that he might be friendly to this suggestion 




3. e Second Encounter with Skepticism in the De-
liverance 
In the rest of this paper, I look at Ghazālī’s solution to the skeptical chal-
lenge in light of what he says in the second part of the Deliverance and 
in the Niche of Light. Textually, my point is that in reading Ghazālī’s re-
sponse to skepticism, we must note that the notion of “light” is a tech-
nical term for him. When understood in its proper technical sense, 
Ghazālī’s claim that the “light” resolves the skeptical challenge is philo-
sophically interesting. 
3.1. e second crisis 
e skeptical “crisis” that we discussed in Section 2, appears in the first 
few pages of the Deliverance. In those pages, Ghazālī is talking about a 
crisis in his youth which he claims to have lasted for about two months. 
Towards the end of the book, Ghazālī discusses a second personal 
crisis that takes place some years later. is time, he is already an estab-
lished scholar in Baghdād. In a number of moving passages, he laments 
that he has engaged the sciences and knowledge only at a superficial 
level. He reports an episode of talking to himself: 
Away! Up and away! Only a little is left of your life, and a long 
journey lies before you! All the theory and practice in which 
you are engrossed is eyeservice and fakery! (Al-Ghazālī 2006, 
53–54) 
is episode lasts for about six months, leading to what seems like de-
pression: 
I struggled with myself to teach for a single day, to gratify the 
hearts of the students who were frequenting my lectures, but 
my tongue would not utter a single word: I was completely un-
able to say anything. As a result that impediment of my speech 
cause a sadness in my heart accompanied by an inability to di-
gest; food and drink became unpalatable to me so that I could 
neither swallow broth easily nor digest a mouthful of solid 
food. That led to such a weakening of my powers that the phy-
sicians lost hope of treating me. (Al-Ghazālī 2006, 54) 
I argue that this second crisis is also skeptical in nature. ere are three 
reasons for this claim. First, the crisis comes as a result of “search for 
truth.” is becomes clear when we note his characterization of the pro-
cess that leads to this second crisis: 
When God Most High […] had cured me of this sickness [i.e. 
the first skeptical crisis], I was of the view that the categories 
of those seeking the truth were limited to four groups. (Al-
Ghazālī 2006, 24) 
e four groups that he names are rational theologist [kalām], Aristote-




I then said to myself: “The truth cannot transcend these four 
categories, for these are the men who are following the paths 
of the quest for truth. Hence, if the truth eludes them, there re-
main no hope for ever attaining it […].” (Al-Ghazālī 2006, 25; 
emphasis added) 
Note the conditional form of the last claim. Although God has cured him 
of his skeptical malady for now, the path to the possible despair of skep-
ticism is still open. In other words, the solution to the first skeptical epi-
sode was in some sense incomplete: if that weren’t the case, the possibility 
of never aaining truth would not remain so lively. erefore, it is a de-
sideratum on any reading of the first skeptical argument that there must 
be something preliminary and not fully developed about its resolution.   
Second, aer experimenting with rational theology, Aristotelian 
philosophy, and Ta’līmism, he does rediscover his “malady”. Just like the 
original skeptical episode of his youth, this episode is characterized in 
medical terms. And more importantly, the reason he finds himself in this 
stage is his worry that all his claims to knowledge are mere “fakery” and 
that he does not really understand what he claims to know. In short, 
many years later, he is again uncertain whether his claims to knowledge 
are genuine. 
ird and most notably, Ghazālī characterizes the “cure” to this 
second skeptical crisis in terms of a “light” as well, namely the one and 
only “light on earth from which illumination can be obtained” (Al-
Ghazālī 2006, 57). So, there is a strong prima facie case to identify the 
“light” that resolves the second crisis with the one that resolves the first 
crisis. Firstly, both “lights” are the sources of certain knowledge. Sec-
ondly, he insists that there is only one light that is ultimately the source 
of certain knowledge. So, not only the conditions that are resolved are 
similar (i.e. they are both skeptical episodes), but also the cure is similar 
– it is characterized as the “light”.31 
Fortunately, unlike the first case, Ghazālī tells us much more about the 
nature of the “light” that cures the second skeptical crisis. In this second 
episode, he notes that he discovered the light by adopting the Sufi set of 
ascetic practices, including long periods of seclusion and meditation. He 
claims to have engaged in these practices for two years in travel, and for 
another ten years upon return to Iran. Notably, he claims that these prac-
tices lead him to the regain certain knowledge: 
For ten years I remained in that condition. In the course of 
those periods of solitude  things impossible to enumerate or 
details in depth were disclosed to me. This much I shall men-
tion […]: I knew with certainty that the sufis are those who 
uniquely follow the way of God Most High, their mode of life 
is the best of all, their way the most direct of ways, and their 
 
31 Götz does not elaborate on this, but he also seems to identify the “light” that 




ethics the purest. Indeed, were one to combine the insight of 
the intellectuals, the wisdom of the wise, and the lore of schol-
ars versed in the mysterious revelation in order to change a 
single item of sufi conduct and ethic and to replace it with 
something better, no way to do so would be found! (Al-Ghazālī 
2006, 56–57; emphasis added.) 
It is astonishing for anyone to have such a high level of confidence in any 
doctrine. But it is even more surprising to hear this level certainty from 
Ghazālī who started the very same book with establishing such rigid 
standards for knowledge with certainty. However, this puzzling level of 
certainty makes beer sense when we read what follows immediately: 
For all their [Sufis] motions and quiescences, exterior and in-
terior, are learned from the light of the niche of prophecy. And 
beyond the light of prophecy there is no light on earth from which 
illumination can be obtained. (Al-Ghazālī 2006, 57; emphasis 
added)  
us, allegedly, these Sufi practices connect Ghazālī with the one and 
only light from which certainty can be gained, namely the light of the 
niche of prophecy. So, if my hypothesis is true that the light of that one 
gets through Sufism is in some sense the same as the light that saved 
Ghazālī from his first skeptical challenge (since, “beyond the light of 
prophecy there is no light on earth from which illumination can be ob-
tained”), then we might beer understand his first anti-skeptical argu-
ment by looking at his views about Sufism.  
To try this, I will look at his commentary on Sufi practices in the 
second part of the Deliverance and the Niche of Light. e laer book is a 
detailed commentary on a single verse in r’ān (commonly known as 
the “Light Verse”)32 and an associated hadīth by Prophet Mohammad 
(commonly known as the “Veils Hadīth”).33 
 
3.2. Revisiting the internalist circle 
Recall the last step of Ghazālī’s skeptical argument, i.e. the Internalist 
Circle: on the one hand, internalists accept rational derivations as the 
only standard of proof. On the other hand, all rational derivations must 
rely on some primary cognition of reason. Accordingly, he concludes that 
 
32 “God is the Light of the heavens and the earth. The parable of His Light is a 
niche, wherein is a lamp. The lamp is in a glass. The glass is a shining star kin-
dled from a blessed olive tree, neither of the East or of the West. Its oil would 
well-nigh shine forth, even if no fire had touched it. Light upon light. God guides 
unto His Light whomsoever He will, and God sets forth parables for mankind, 
and God is Knower of all things” Quran (Nasar 2017, 24:35). 
33 “God has seventy veils of light and darkness; were He to lift them, the august 
glories of His face would burn up everyone whose eyesight perceived Him.” As 




on pain of vicious circularity, the skeptical challenge against the safety 
of primary cognitions could not be answered via “precisely formulated 
proofs” (Al-Ghazālī 2006, 23). 
To generalize, Ghazālī seems to think that internalists are 
trapped by their own standards of rational derivation. On their account, 
if there is no rational derivation from an agent’s epistemic reasons to a 
proposition p, then p is not a possible object of knowledge for her. To be 
sure, the agent’s epistemic position34 could change if she tests new hy-
pothesis and finds new evidence. However, there is a limit to this proce-
dure. For the internalist agent, the space of possible objects of knowledge 
is pre-determined by the conjunction of standards of rational derivation, 
and one’s currently accessible epistemic reasons. One’s evidence could 
surely change. But there does not seem to be any escape from one’s 
standards of rational derivation (captured by one’s primary cognitions), 
nor is there any non-circular way to be certain that those standards are 
the correct ones. For Ghazālī that meant that our standards of rational 
derivation, and thus all our subsequent claims to knowledge, are not safe. 
According to Ghazālī, Sufis can offer a path to knowledge with certainty 
precisely because they do not rely only on rational derivations to acquire 
knowledge. Rather, they also rely on a set of activities involving ritualis-
tic mental and bodily practices that supposedly provide the Sufis with 
certain knowledge. is Sufi route to knowledge (if we could make sense 
of it) would work independently of primary cognitions because the ac-
quired knowledge is not derived by a rational derivation.  
In short, by accepting the Sufi path towards certain knowledge, Ghazālī 
abandons internalism in a limited sense. Here, he does not arrive at 
knowledge of the foundations of cognition by offering a rational deriva-
tion from one’s epistemic reasons. Instead, he claims to arrive at that 
knowledge by nonrational means – thus, if the Sufi method were a pos-
sible way of arriving at knowledge, it would not face the circularity prob-
lem in the same way. 
3.3. Transformative internalism 
However, in an important sense, Ghazālī still remains an internalist. To 
be sure, the resultant knowledge of the Sufi practices is not immediately 
available from the agent’s epistemic position. In fact, for this reason, at 
the outset, Ghazālī does not claim that he is certain that engaging in Sufi 
practices will result in certain knowledge. Rather, he treats it as a possible 
experiment, one that might result in certainty.  
As we saw, textually, this engagement with Sufism comes aer 
he has experimented with rational theology, Aristotelian philosophy, and 
 
34 As I use the term, an agent’s epistemic position consists of the facts that de-
termine which epistemic reasons, and which derivations from those reasons, are 
available to her. To change one’s epistemic position amounts to either changing 
the body of available epistemic reasons, or changing the conditions of being able 




Ta’līmism.35 Ghazālī is dismissive of Ta’līmism wholesale. He acknowl-
edges that rational theology and Aristotelian philosophy might provide 
knowledge in a qualified sense. Nevertheless, he does not think that they 
can help him arrive at the fundamental certain knowledge. For example, 
he acknowledges that mathematical truths are known with apodictic cer-
tainty (Al-Ghazālī 2006, 32). But that just means that from the standpoint 
of reason, the claims of mathematics can be proved with certainty. How-
ever, the certainty of reason itself as the foundational source of these 
claims to knowledge cannot be proved by mathematics or other sciences 
that presuppose the authority of reason. Likewise, he argues that within 
rational theology we can make certain proofs. But all those claims to 
knowledge remain conditional on proving the certainty of our basic 
sources of knowledge. As he puts it, this conditional or qualified sense of 
certainty “was not sufficient in my case, nor was it a remedy for the mal-
ady which I was complaining”(Al-Ghazālī 2006, 26). 
Eventually, he turns to Sufism for experimentation. But crucially, this ex-
perimentation is still directed at placing Ghazālī in an epistemic position 
where the ground for certain knowledge becomes transparent to him. 
is transformation, from an epistemic agent who were not in position 
to recognize the ground of his certain knowledge to a new kind of epis-
temic agent, amounts to Ghazālī’s answer to skepticism. Let me unpack 
this idea.   
I speculate that Ghazālī tries to escape the Internalist Circle by abandon-
ing the original rationalist internalism, and adopting transformative-in-
ternalism:   
TRANSFORMATIVE-INTERNALISM: S can know p  only if either: 
(a) p can be arrived at by subjecting S’s feasibly accessible ep-
istemic reasons to rational inquiry, or  
(b) p can be arrived at by subjecting S*’s feasibly accessible ep-
istemic reasons to S*’s principles of inquiry where S can by 
nonrational means transfer herself into S*. 
e first clause of transformative-internalism is identical to the ordinary 
kind of internalism we have discussed so far. Ghazālī seems to hold that 
for non-fundamental truths (e.g., those discovered by rational theology 
or Aristotelian philosophy) the first clause is a legitimate principle for 
knowledge. at is, insofar as our conditional claims to knowledge go we 
can rely on the first clause. All those claims remain conditional in the 
sense that the first clause presupposes the authority of rational princi-
ples, but the rational principles cannot be grounded via the method of he 
first clause.    
 
35 “When I had finished with all those kinds of lore, I brought my mind to bear 




e second clause concerns a special case. On the one hand, we 
are asked to think that there are epistemic reasons that are not accessible 
to an agent via rational reflection on their feasibly accessible epistemic 
reasons. On the other hand, we are told that it is possible, via nonrational 
means, to change the situation of the agent and make those reasons ac-
cessible to her. Now, Ghazālī has argued that in the special context of 
proving the safety of the foundations of knowledge, we cannot arrive at 
our target via rational reflection on our epistemic reasons. If so, he holds, 
we may have warrant to try to change our epistemic position via nonra-
tional means in hope of uncovering epistemic reasons that were not ac-
cessible to us previously.  
For Ghazālī, this warrant (to seek nonrational means to change 
our epistemic positions in search of new epistemic reasons) seems to be 
given by two kinds of consideration: First, in the context of dealing with 
skepticism, the epistemic stakes are high. We have arrived at a position 
where we are now casting doubt on all our beliefs. We saw that the first 
encounter with skepticism ended in radical doubt, and the second en-
counter was characterized as the last “hope for ever aaining” truth (Al-
Ghazālī 2006, 25). ese are both extremely bad epistemic positions to 
find ourselves in. Drastic epistemic situations, we may say, call for drastic 
epistemic policies. Second, and as I noted above, Ghazālī characterizes 
both skeptical episodes as deeply troubling in practical terms: they 
turned into physical maladies that needed to be cured. He thus seems to 
think that in dire situations we may have a practical reason to experiment 
with nonrational means of transforming our epistemic position to new 
positions that are not otherwise available to us. 
But what does it mean to say that nonrational methods may transfer us 
into a new epistemic position, such that new epistemic reasons become 
available to us? And, perhaps more importantly, how is that an internalist 
answer to skepticism at all? at is, how are these nonrational methods 
different from a brute causal force? I answer these questions in turn. 
 
3.4. e ladder of imagination 
On my reading, Ghazālī holds that the right kind of nonrational methods 
can transfer us into a new epistemic position by actualizing a ‘higher’ 
capacity for knowledge, i.e., prophecy or ‘cultivated imagination’. Once 
actualized, the kind of knowledge that we acquire through this capacity 
has a kind of immediacy or certainty that is safe – it is impossible to 
doubt it, and that impossibility is positively established. In other words, 
Ghazālī argues that by going through these nonrational methods we dis-
cover that TWO-SOURCES is false, and that we have access to sources of 




First, Ghazālī contends that following the Sufi manual of physical and 
mental rituals and practices (what he calls, “the Way” [ṭarīq])36 will result 
in having new kinds of experiences:   
From the very start of the Way, revelations and visions begin, 
so that, even when awake, the sufis see the angels and the spir-
its of the prophets and hear voices coming from them and learn 
useful things from them. (Al-Ghazālī 2006, 58) 
It might be difficult to ignore Ghazālī’s heavily supernatural interpreta-
tion of these experiences. But at least certain aspects of his characteriza-
tion of these experiences are familiar enough. For instance, he notes that 
the “most distinctive characteristic” of Sufi’s knowledge is that it: 
… can be attained, not by study, but rather the taste [al- ḏawq], 
and the state [al-ḥāl] and “the exchange of qualities” [tabaddul 
al-ṣifa], meaning cultivation of virtue]. How great a difference 
there is between your knowing the definition and causes of 
condition of health and satiety and your being healthy and 
sated! And how great a difference there is between your know-
ing the definition of drunkenness – viz. that it is a term denot-
ing a state resulting from the predominance of vapors which 
rise from the stomach to the centers of thought – and your ac-
tually being drunk! (Al-Ghazālī 2006, 52; translation modified) 
Crucially then, for Ghazālī, the knowledge that is provided by Sufism has, 
what we may call, a non-prepositional character. It is a kind of knowledge 
through acquaintance. Puing the two passages together, then the fol-
lowing picture emerges: by way of following Sufi mental and bodily prac-
tices, one starts to have imaginative experiences from which one can 
learn, not in the sense of learning specific set of propositions, but in the 
sense of being acquainted with certain non-propositional truths.  
To be sure, here, Ghazālī is following a rich Sufi tradition with 
all its subtleties, but at least some of those insights can be extracted from 
that tradition. e basic idea is that we can engage in concentrated phys-
ical and mental exercises which, in turn, would interact with us in some-
what surprising ways. ey are “surprising” in that although in one sense 
we create them, we still learn new information from them. For instance, 
consider a much tamer example of an immersive, concentrated, and cul-
tivated imaginative exercise:  
I recently read Dostoevsky’s Brothers Karamazov. I read the 
book over a long period of time, read one page at a time, at 
specific hours. I would often pause and imagine the scenes. I 
would go overboard and fantasize about things that were not 
in the actual novel but could have been. Of course, when I was 
engaged in these activities, I was not thinking about them as 
 
36 Often, Sufis documented these practices in Sufi “manuals”. For a translated 




an exercise – I was not thinking about the images, but the im-
agined world itself. My imagination became somewhat obses-
sive to the point that I started having dreams about the story. 
But then, something even more interesting happened: I started 
to surprise myself. I “discovered” new things about the charac-
ters, I had conversations with them, and I was often persuaded 
by them to think differently about this or that matter. The im-
agined world started having a life of its own, and as a result, I 
was learning in unexpected ways. 
What we have here is a description of immersive imaginative exercise. 
For Ghazālī, it is a basic feature of the psychology of imagination that 
while one-off acts of imagination are oen misleading, a cultivated fac-
ulty of imagination can transform our epistemic position by offering us 
experiences where we “see [,…] hear voices […] and learn useful things” 
(Al-Ghazālī 2006, 58). Again, the basic idea is familiar enough. For in-
stance, consider Susana Schellenberg’s discussion of “imaginative im-
mersion” as opposed to one-off imaginative acts: 
Imaginative immersion has a range of different functions. It al-
lows us to escape from the real world; it allows us to identify 
with fictional characters; and perhaps most importantly it al-
lows us to learn and develop. By acting and feeling as if we 
have a perspective different than our own, we can learn what 
to do were we to have that perspective. When children play 
chase, a game widespread among mammals, they may pretend 
to be chased by a predator or to be a predator. Chase play is not 
only fun; it trains for events that are hazardous and costly. The 
more immersed children are in the game, the more they invest 
in the game; the more invested in the game they are, the more 
educational the game is. (Schellenberg 2013, 507–8)37 
Notably, the subjects of immersive imagination learns because they “lose 
themselves in imagination such that the fictional world in some way, at 
least temporarily, becomes the real world” (Schellenberg 2013, 507). Of 
course, this modern account of immersive imagination is at best a distant 
relative of Ghazālī’s account of cultivated imagination. But Ghazālī does 
explain the psychology of Sufi practices, and how they transfer our epis-
temic position in a manner that is at least similar in outline. Recall that 
in the Deliverance, the one and only “light” that resolves his second skep-
tical episode comes through following the Sufi rituals of mental and 
physical exercises. But what is the relevant psychological change that 
takes place, in virtue of which he comes to claim an extremely high de-
gree of confidence in the certainty of his knowledge?  
I think the answer is based on a model similar to our account of 
immersive imagination in that for Ghazālī, the Sufi practices cultivate his 
imagination, and as a result his epistemic position change. On his 
 




account, imaginative exercises can transform our epistemic position be-
cause in entertaining these images and ideas, we willingly “let go”. We 
thus teach ourselves new things by leing our imagination play freely.38 
is is possible because the logic of free play of imagination, so to speak, 
is not the logic of rational derivation. us, when imagination is concen-
trated and immersive, Ghazālī suggests, it takes a life of its own, and it 
can thus transform us. He writes: 
Imagination [khīyal] […] is solid and dense. It veils the myster-
ies and comes between you and lights, But when the imagina-
tion is purified so that it becomes like clear glass, then it does 
not obstruct the lights; rather it becomes a pointer towards the 
lights […] Know that the low, dense, imaginal world became for 
the prophets a glass, a niche of lights, a purifier of the mysteries, 
and a ladder to the highest world. (Al-Ghazālī 1998, 34) 
So, although ordinary imagination “comes between you and light,” 
Ghazālī identifies purified or cultivated imagination with a faculty that 
makes a new kind of knowledge available to us, i.e., the faculty of proph-
ecy. at is, in the case of a completely cultivated imagination, he holds, 
the faculty just is the very “niche of light” of the prophet. Ghazālī thus 
claims that a cultivated faculty of imagination is the ladder to the source 
of certain knowledge (i.e., the light of prophecy). In an enigmatic passage, 
he writes: 
That which occurs in dreams is related to prophetic character-
istics, just as [the number] one is related to forty-six, while that 
which occurs in wakefulness is more closely related than this. 
I suppose this relationship is that of one to three. (Al-Ghazālī 
1998, 35)39 
For Ghazālī, the model for gaining access to the certain knowledge of 
prophecy is to place oneself in dream-like states willingly and outside the 
context of dreams. Insofar as these states are dream-like, they have an 
element of losing control and leing the images take control. But insofar 
 
38 For a recent argument on how skilled and cultivated imagination can be a 
reliable source of knowledge, see Kind (2020). Though, Kind puts a lot of empha-
sis on cases where imagination tries to be a substitute for perception or reason-
ing – that is, cases where imagination tries to constrain itself from what she calls 
‘transcendent’ or ‘fantastical’ uses. On the view I’m attributing to Ghazali, the 
real prize in the truth-conducive use of imagination comes from cultivating the 
transcendent and fantastical uses to the extreme. 
39 The reference is to Prophet Mohammad’s saying: “The veridical dream is one 




as these are “wakeful” dream-like states, they have the characteristics of 
an agential, internally transparent mode of knowing things.40 He writes: 
it may happen that some of the prophetic lights rise up and 
take control. Then the senses do not draw him [i.e. the one en-
gaged in the imaginative exercise] to their world and do not 
keep him occupied. He witnesses in wakefulness what some-
one else would witness in a dream. (Al-Ghazālī 1998, 35) 
Recall that in the Deliverance, Ghazālī identified the one and only light 
that can give us illumination and certain knowledge with the light of 
prophecy. We just saw that he identifies the niche of the light of prophecy 
with a cultivated faculty of imagination. us, for Ghazālī, the light 
which is the foundation of all knowledge must be first sought through 
the efforts of the cultivated faculty of imagination.41 
Let’s recap. e initial shape of Ghazālī’s solution to skepticism is this: 
there is a kind of knowledge that one could gain not by rational reflection 
on one’s epistemic reasons. At the same time, this is not a knowledge that 
is just “imposed from outside.” Rather, by engaging in a set of concen-
trated and immersive imaginative practices, one may place oneself in a 
new epistemic position where one gains access to a new source of cogni-
tion – namely, cultivated imagination (and this is now a denial of the Two 
Sources thesis).  
We wanted to know what it means to say that nonrational methods may 
transfer us into a new epistemic position, such that new epistemic rea-
sons become available to us. And the answer was: a cultivated imagina-
tion may acquaint us with certain experiences and truths that were not 
available to us via sensation or reason. But suppose we accepted 
Ghazālī’s claim that by going through certain imaginative exercises we 
become acquainted with possibilities that were not otherwise accessible 
to us. Why should we then accept that these possibilities are in any sense 
superior to the possibilities that rational reflections on our epistemic rea-
sons were availing us? In other words, recall how Ghazālī’s Dream argu-
ment ended. We were le with the unresolved puzzle: e standpoint of 
Sufi mystical experiences are different from the standpoint of reason. But 
how do we adjudicate which one has authority over the other? To put 
the same point differently: How is this an answer to the skeptical chal-
lenge? 
 
40 Or, as we saw, he notes in the Deliverance, “even when awake, the sufis see 
the angels and the spirits of the prophets and hear voices coming from them and 
learn useful things from them.” (Al-Ghazālī 2006, 58) 
41 Note, this falls short of saying that the light of prophecy is an imagined con-
tent. Rather, the point is that imagination is the ladder that takes us to that light 




3.5. Answering skepticism 
Now, clearly Ghazālī holds that there is a standpoint that is more author-
itative than reason. Towards the end of Deliverance, he offers a hierarchy 
of faculties of knowledge. At the lowest level, he places the power of 
senses. en he places the power to discernment between senses (i.e., the 
capacity to have good taste). en he places the power of reason. en 
he writes: 
Beyond the stage of intellect there is another stage. In this an-
other eyes is opened, by which man sees the hidden […] and 
other things, from which the intellect is as far removed as the 
power of discernment is from the perception of perception of 
intelligibles and the power of sensation is from things per-
ceived by discernment. And just as one able only to discern, if 
presented with things perceptible to the intellect, would reject 
them and consider them outlandish, so some men endowed 
with intellect have rejected the things perceptible to the pro-
phetic power and considered them wildly improbable. (Al-
Ghazālī 2006, 60) 
Here he makes two claims. First, that there is a source of cognition above 
reason, namely prophecy. And second, the claims of prophecy are by na-
ture inaccessible to the standpoint of reason. So, again, how do we know 
that the cultivated faculty of imagination (which, as we saw above, in the 
perfect case, just is the faculty of prophecy) gives us a superior stand-
point over reason? 
On the surface, Ghazālī’s response is unlikely to move many of his con-
temporary readers. However, as we will see, there is still an interesting 
element that we can extract from his strategy. First, let’s see Ghazālī’s 
own answer: 
Now if a man born blind did not know about colors and shapes 
from constant report and hearsay, and were to be told about 
them abruptly, he would neither understand them nor 
acknowledge their existence. But God Most High has brought 
the matter within the purview of His creatures by giving them 
a sample of the special character of the prophetic power: sleep-
ing. For the sleeper perceives the unknown that will take place, 
either plainly, or in the guise of an image the meaning of which 
is disclosed by interpretation. (Al-Ghazālī 2006, 60) 
Ghazālī thinks it is obvious that (1) sometimes dreams represent reality, 
and that (2) they represent “prophetic” facts about the future which rea-
son cannot access.42 is aitude towards dreams is even clearer in the 
paragraph that follows immediately: 
 




If a man had no personal experience of dreaming and someone 
were to tell him: “There are some men who fall down uncon-
scious as though they were dead, and their perception, hearing, 
and sight leave them, and they then perceive what is ‘hidden’,” 
he would deny it and give apodeictic proof of the impossibility 
of saying: “The sensory powers are the causes of perception. 
Therefore one who does not perceive such things when his 
powers are present and functioning a fortiori will not perceive 
them when his powers are suspended.” (Al-Ghazālī 2006, 60–
61) 
Here, again, Ghazālī seems to presuppose that “veridical” dreams are ac-
tual. Since veridical dreams are actual, and they do represent reality that 
reason or sensation cannot access, he goes on to argue that there is an-
other source of cognition that is superior to reason and sensation – 
namely, prophecy. He thus revises the Two Sources thesis. 
Now, of course, we might be skeptical about the existence of ‘prophetic’ 
dreams – especially, under the description of dreams that give us 
knowledge of future events. Or, at best, even if we thought that might be 
possible, our aitude towards such things falls far below the kind of ab-
solute certainty that Ghazālī was aer. However, I think the main idea 
behind Ghazālī’s argument is obscured by focusing on his aitude to-
wards veridical dreams per se. Rather, I think, the argument takes a sur-
prising and interesting turn. I reconstruct his argument as follows: 
1. If through cultivated imagination I come to know some x 
with safety, then cultivated imagination is safe. 
2. I followed the Sufi practices [i.e., I cultivate my imagina-
tion in a special way], and I [Ghazālī] came to know x with 
safety.  
3. Thus, cultivated imagination is safe.     
e first premise must be easier to accept – it seems intuitive that only a 
safe source of knowledge can provide particular instances of knowledge 
with safety. So, if a source of knowledge actually provides a piece of 
knowledge with certainty, then (at least in the relevant domains) it is a 
safe source of knowledge. Ghazālī thus writes, “the proof of [the] possi-
bility [of prophecy] is its existence.”43 
e second premise is of course much more controversial. Aer 
all, the Sufi practices is one among many other types of immersive imag-
inative experiences one could have. How can Ghazālī know that the Sufi 
practices can give us any safe knowledge, i.e. how can he prove that the 
deliverances of Sufism cannot be doubted? 
Now, first, note that the choice between the Sufi practices and 
other possible imaginative experiences cannot be adjudicated by reason 
 




or sensation. Of course, one could treat the content of an immersive im-
aginative experience as if it were a content of sensation or a rational 
judgment. But that would be like telling a child that her arms are not 
actually wings when she is pretending to fly. In that case, our claim 
would be correct only in a defective sense, because we would be misun-
derstanding the norms of the child’s game. To generalize, it is one thing 
to say the Sufi practices and other possible imaginative experiences can-
not be adjudicated by reason or sensation, and another thing to say that 
the Sufi practices and other possible imaginative experiences cannot be 
adjudicated at all. Likewise, it is one thing to say that the epistemic rea-
son that are accessible to me via reason and sensation do not favor Sufi 
practices over other possible imaginative exercises, and another thing to 
say that I have no accessible epistemic reasons that favor one set of prac-
tices over the other. In other words, if Two Sources is false, then our un-
derstanding of how internalism works must be modified.  
us, the mere fact that immersive imaginative experiences are 
not evaluable by rational standards give Ghazālī an opening. is is why 
he oen insists that even ordinary ‘false’ dreams have an epistemic sig-
nificance. For him, dreams as a type are in the family of states that re-
semble prophecy and mystic experiences. It is true that in representing 
this world, some dreams are mere illusions. However, he seems to think 
that as a type of representation, all dreams point to the existence of a 
standpoint that is independent from reason and sensation. In the Revival 
he writes:  
those who are sleeping, once they have distanced themselves 
from the realm of the senses, draw near to that realm [of the 
hereafter], for sleep is the brother of death, so they may see in 
their sleep creatures bearing these qualities [...]” (Al-Ghazālī 
2016, 141; emphasis added) 
Similar to the Dream Argument, the above passage makes the point that 
there is a kind of experience, e.g. of dreaming, immersive imagination, or 
prophecy that is not subject to the rules of reason and sensation. is 
gives us an opening for a kind of experience that follows a different set 
of rules. In other words, it is an opening for Internalism with three 
sources: sensation, reason, and cultivated imagination. Each source of 
knowledge provides access to a set of epistemic reasons. e rules of “de-
riving” knowledge from those epistemic reasons is different depending 
on the source.  
And now, we are at the final step of the argument: for Ghazālī, 
the safety of the Sufi practices can only be experienced by the inquiring 
agent herself. at is, for the kind of epistemic reason which cultivated 
imagination avails us, the proper rules of derivation are inherently pri-
vate to the subject of those experience. Notably, this is not to say that the 
basing of knowledge on those experiences is inaccessible to the knower 
(i.e., Internalism is not rejected). Rather, it is to say that the basing rela-
tion is accessible to the knower and only to the knower (note: we may 
accept Internalism, and reject the idea that all derivability relations are 




Admiedly, this must be somewhat disappointing, but also ines-
capable. It is disappointing because we cannot evaluate Ghazālī’s second 
premise unless we actually and earnestly follow the Sufi practices. 
Ghazālī promises us that by so doing, we will come to have experiences 
that have a certain epistemic mark: the establish their own safety. And it 
is inescapable that we would end up with a solution like this because 
taking immersive imagination as a genuine source of knowledge is mo-
tivated by thinking that first-personal experiences are epistemically 
unique and not reducible to third-personal testimony and descriptions. 
He thus writes: 
The properties of prophecy […] can be perceived only by frui-
tional experience as a result of following the way of Sufism. For 
you have understood that only because of an example you have 
been given, viz., sleep; were it not for this, you would not as-
sent to that. If, then, the prophet has a special quality of which 
you have no example and which you in no wise understand, 
how can you find it credible? Assent comes only after under-
standing. But the example needed occurs in the first stages of 
the way of Sufism. Then, through this example, one obtains a 
kind of fruitional experience commensurate with the progress 
made plus a kind of assent to what has not been attained based 
on analogy with what has been attained. So this single property 
we have mentioned is enough ground for you to believe in the 
basis of prophecy. (Al-Ghazālī 2006, 62)   
 
In summary then, the argument exploits a general feature of cultivated 
imaginative experiences: they are first-personal and immersive in such a 
way that they cannot be genuinely apprehended from the standpoint of 
rational inquiry. Cultivated imagination does not establish a truth by way 
of rationally deriving a premise from given epistemic reasons. ey are 
thus not subject to the worries that concerned the Internalist Circle. To 
put things crudely: the world of immersive imagination is a wild world, 
and Ghazālī claims that because of this unruliness, and not despite it, one 
can find a safe source of knowledge in it.   
Finally, let me turn to the interpretative puzzle of the paper: What can 
we learn about Ghazālī’s abrupt resolution to the first skeptical episode 
by looking at the second skeptical episode? As the above passage shows, 
Ghazālī’s conception of ‘transformative experiences’ is gradual and de-
velopmental.44 Even false dreams have an important epistemic function: 
they give us a primitive taste for the kind of cognitive state that is poten-
tially available to us.  We now can explain that:  
 
 
44 Contrast with the often dramatic, one-off experiences that are discussed in 




(1) e “light” that cured Ghazālī’s skepticism in his youth was 
not sufficient to protect him from the skeptical maladies of 
his older age. From the very short description that he leaves 
us with, all we can say is that the first skeptical episode 
comes to an end because he has some, albeit unsophisticated, 
imaginative experience of the light of prophecy. us, alt-
hough he can see the light of cultivated imagination to a de-
gree, he cannot fully grasp it. 
 
(2) As we just saw, Ghazālī indicates that this sort of unsophis-
ticated imaginative experience “occurs in the first stages of 
the way of Sufism” (Al-Ghazālī 2006, 62). Later, when the Sufi 
cultivates his faculty of imagination, he can “obtain a kind of 
fruitional experience” that was not previously available to 
him. In other words, he now understands the light which he 
knew only partially in his youth. “Assent comes only aer 
understanding” (ibid.).  
 
And these features together satisfy the desideratum that I posited earlier. 
We can now explain why the resolution of the first skeptical challenge 
was incomplete, why the second episode was hanging over Ghazālī’s 
head, and still, we have the outlines of an account to say in what sense 
the first “light” was still related to the light of prophecy. Ghazālī insists 
that many imaginative experiences serve as “analogy”, “example”, or 
primitive instance of the full-fledged imaginative experiences of proph-
ecy. On my reading, the first skeptical episode comes to an end, because 




I positioned my reading of Ghazālī as an alternative to what I called the 
simple fideist reading. e alternative that I have offered is still to some 
extent fideist, but maers are mor complicated than it looked at first. For 
one thing, as we saw, Ghazālī insists that the Sufi path (and by extension, 
the path of Prophet Muhammad) is the only kind of immersive imagina-
tive exercise that can get us to safe knowledge. I offered no argument for 
that claim to exclusivity, partly because I do not think he offers any good 
arguments for that claim. Indeed, if we follow his lead in accepting that 
claims of immersive imagination can be verified or falsified only by first-
hand personal experiencing, then it seems impossible to establish a claim 
to exclusivity (unless we had enough time and resources to go through 
all possible regiments of imaginative immersion).  
However, the reading is still fideist – or ‘mystical’ – in an im-
portant sense: the solution to the skeptical challenge is an invitation to 
follow a set of physical and mental exercises that somehow, in a way that 
in principle we cannot understand from our current point of view, would 




accept this invitation unless they were desperate – and that is perhaps 
why Ghazālī describes the sheer desperation of his skeptical state so dra-
matically.45  
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